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The mechanical power press in its application in the
metal stamping and forming industry has been misinterpreted
as a self-contained metal forming system. Examination of
the production routines involving the press show that this
machine is actually only one elemental component of the
metal forming system and not the total production unit.
Authoritative codes and standards pertinent to the
mechanical power press have reflected this misinterpre-
tation by not including system considerations in their con-
tents. These omissions have resulted in the providing of
safeguards which do not properly reflect the particular
characteristics of the metal forming system to which they
are applied. This has resulted in the continuing occurrence
of point of operation (die closure area) injuries.
Product liability litigation resulting from point of
operation injuries has increased substantially in recent
years. This has been caused in part by two related factors:
the application of non-system oriented codes and standards
in judging the propriety of metal forming system performance
and the exclusion of statutes of limitations on machinery
involved in industrial accidents based on date of manufacture.
These two factors have created unrealistic demands on the
performance requirements of the power press and have re-
sulted in less than adequate success in properly deter-
mining liability and directing economic recovery for point
of operation injuries.
Revisions in present codes, standards and statutes of
limitations are necessary if permanent reductions in point
of operation injuries are to be realized.
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The need for providing adequate protection for the
employee in order to insure him a safe and hazard-free
work atmosphere is recognized as a common goal of industry.
This goal and the need for achieving it are especially
critical in the metal stamping and forming industry. The
inherently dangerous nature of the production routines per-
formed in this type of manufacturing result in a frequency
of worker exposure to hazardous and potentially injurious
point of operation (die closure area) situations not nor-
mally encountered in other manufacturing fields. Such a
rate of exposure demands that operating personnel be pro-
vided with proper point of operation protection. In order
to accomplish this, an initial requirement is the recogni-
tion and understanding of both the individual machine
components and the operation of the overall production
system that is involved in the manufacturing process being
employed. Once this clarification has been achieved,
meaningful progress can then be made toward providing
proper point of operation safeguards for the system's
operator.
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Each stamping or forming operation has certain aspects
which differentiate that production routine from the next.
These special characteristics give each metal forming sy-
stem a particular complexion with respect to its functional
operation and its safeguard needs. The assessing of these
needs must be performed with respect to the system and not
its individual components if the end results are to prove
fruitful.
The mechanical power press is a basic and essential
component in a stamping or forming production system. As
such, a clear understanding of the press' function or pur-
pose in the production system, as well as a thorough know-
ledge of its operational capabilities, is a prerequisite
to assuring the safety and protection of the operator
utilizing it. It is the misinterpretation of the press'
function in relation to the overall system involved that
is presently a primary obstacle to the providing of proper
system point of operation safeguards.
3.
CHAPTER II
THE PRESS - SYSTEM RELATIONSHIP 
The design and function of the mechanical power press
has been misinterpreted as being that of a complete, self-
contained product producing unit. In actuality, the press
as a single machine does not constitute a complete system,
but rather is only one elemental component of a larger
production configuration - the metal forming system.
A metal forming system is generally categorized as
either performing a primary or a secondary operation. A
primary operation is more commonly known as a blanking pro-
cess. Here, the system produces the stock or pieces which,
in many cases, will be used by another system performing
a secondary operation. The blanking operation usually en-
tails the punching or blanking of pieces from roll or strip
stock. The secondary operation is more commonly known as
a forming process. A metal forming system involved in this
type of operation utilizes the blanks produced from a primary
operation and forms them into the particular physical shape
required.
Although the press is one basic component, the metal
forming system also includes: the dies, the actuation
4.
devices, the feed and ejection methods, and the point of
operation safeguards (guards and devices). A detailed
examination of point of operation safeguards will be pro-
vided in Chapter III. The following discussion will serve
to clarify the relationship of the remaining four components
to the total system.
The Mechanical Power Press 
The power press component is a general purpose machine
designed to function as the means of supplying the power
required to accomplish the metal forming process. Mechani-
cal power presses are normally characterized or identified
by their frames.
In general, presses of less than two hundred tons
capacity are typified by C-type frames. This frame style
is popular because it permits access to the die area from
the front as well as both sides. Such access allows for a
greater variety of die and feed method combinations. A
further development of the C-type press is the OBI or open
back inclinable design. This additional feature permits
the frame to be tilted backwards permitting gravity ejection
of parts or scrap through the open rear area of the frame.
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The OBI design is quite functional and is probably the
most commonly used in the metal stamping and forming
industry. Another adaptation of the C-type is the adjust-
able bed press. It is similar to the C-type except that
its bed is vertically adjustable whereas the C-type is
fixed. The horning press represents a further variation
of the standard C-type design. Instead of a flat bed,
however, the horning press is fitted with a horn or rounded
and elongated work bed for use in the production of cylin-
drical articles requiring riveted, punched or bumped side
seams.
Presses exceeding two hundred tons capacity generally
incorporate a straight side frame configuration consisting
of two or more columns. This type of press has a wider bed
than those previously discussed, but does not have the de-
gree of access to the die area that the C-type possesses.
Regardless of variations in design or capacity, mech-
anical power presses are generally grouped into either of
two major divisions by the type of clutch they employ -
full-revolution or part-revolution. The full-revolution
category includes, among others: sliding pin, rolling key,
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sliding key and jaw clutch designs. While these clutches
may differ in the particular methods utilized to accomplish
engagement and disengagement, presses incorporating these
full-revolution clutches possess one common operating
characteristic. Once the clutch is engaged, the press ram
must complete a full cycle or stroke before the clutch can
be disengaged and the ram stopped. As a result of this
operating characteristic, full-revolution clutches are
provided with single stroke mechanisms included as integral
parts of the clutch to insure that only one stroke or cycle
is allowed at each engagement. Anti-repeat provisions are
also designed into the control systems for these clutch
mechanisms. This feature prevents the initiation of another
stroke of the press until all tripping mechanisms have been
released following the initiation of the previous stroke.
The part-revolution or friction clutch category includes
various types of clutches which, regardless of their designs,
have certain basic elements in common. These include: sets
of opposing friction surfaces, the means of applying torque
to and from these surfaces, and-the means of maintaining
contact between the friction surfaces when required. Part-
revolution clutches normally can be engaged and disengaged
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whenever desired. Thus, presses incorporating part-revolu-
tion clutches in their designs possess the desirable oper-
ational ability to permit stopping of the cycle or stroke
of the press ram at any position and time following engage-
ment of the clutch.
It is evident, from the basic operational differences
between these two major press divisions, that metal forming
systems utilizing presses equipped with full-revolution
clutches present a greater safety hazard than do those
incorporating part-revolution clutches. In addition, since
the full-revolution design predates the part-revolution
variety, presses incorporating full-revolution clutches are
usually much older in years and more amassed in service
hours than those employing part-revolution clutches. In
many cases, the early vintage full-revolution presses have
found their way into metal forming systems as used machines.
These machines have experienced varying degrees of alter-
ation to their original designs. As a result, the signifi-
cance of these alterations in terms of potential safety
hazards can only be speculated.
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The Dies 
The die set or tooling employed in the metal forming
system represents the most variable of all the system
components. The possible combinations of forms and con-
figurations of dies are literally as numerous as the
number of different shapes or forms one is able to imagine.
The variety of consumer products available today that
utilize stamped or formed metal parts is a graphic illus-
tration of this conceptual spectrum. The designing and
building of dies is a highly specialized field and repre-
sents an entire industry in itself. While many die building
firms commercially design and build dies for industry
purchase and use, many stamping and forming businesses
design and build their own dies "in house". This has become
more prevalent as a result of greater diversification and
specialization in product manufacturing.
Dies are divided into two general groupings: cutting
or shearing dies and shaping or forming dies. Operations
such as blanking, punching or shearing are performed with
cutting dies which displace the metal stock between the
cutting edges of the dies to produce a shearing fracture.
Shaping dies, on the other hand, are employed only to change
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the form of a work piece. These dies are used in operations
such as bending, drawing or embossing and involve no cutting
operation.
Dies differ in material feeding and ejecting arrange-
ments as well as in uniqueness of shape or contour. Side
feeding and scrap ejection with bottom part removal is a
typical arrangement utilized in blanking operations. An-
other variation is front-to-rear feeding and scrap ejection
with bottom part removal. Forming operations generally use
dies which provide a single front or side feed direction
combined with either a front, side or rear part ejection
provision.
The variety of die forms and configurations, in essence,
illustrates the variety of metal forming systems possible.
The use of a given die set dictates a potential arrangement
of the metal forming system not necessarily required by the
previous tooling employed. Practically speaking, the dies
play an important role in formalizing the system's com-
position and arrangement.
The Actuation Devices 
Actuation of the press is accomplished by means of
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various types of foot or hand operated devices. These de-
vices activate the press control system which in turn
engages the clutch mechanism to effect a production cycle
of the machine.
Although some early vintage full-revolution presses
incorporated two-hand trip levers, most employed a foot
pedal or foot-operated lever in conjunction with a mechani-
cal linkage system to cause clutch engagement. As a result
of this mechanical linkage system, only one type of actu-
ation device could be used. Full-revolution presses of
more recent design utilize pneumatic or electro/pneumatic
control systems. Straight pneumatic systems usually employ
two-hand trip valve actuation devices, while electro/pneu-
matic systems are equipped with two-hand push buttons or
a single foot switch. These latter actuation devices
electrically operate a solenoid valve which actuates the
pneumatic portion of the control system and results in
clutch engagement.
The vintage of the press, assuming it has not been
altered subsequent to manufacture, will usually dictate
the type of control system employed and the type of actu-
ation device(s) that may be selected as the means for
11.
operating it. Earlier vintage full-revolution clutch presses
which usually utilize straight mechanical linkage controls
with single foot-lever operating devices, are obviously
lacking versatility of actuation. As a result, these
presses have become quite susceptible to revisions in their
control system designs in order to employ pneumatic or
electro/pneumatic methods of control and to permit the use
of the wider range of actuation devices that are available
with these types of systems. Most such revisions are per-
formed without the knowledge or advice of the press manu-
facturer. Thus, while these revisions may appear adequate,
the original design of the clutch mechanism of the press
may not be compatible with the particular alteration per-
formed. As a result, the altered machine often represents
a sacrifice in safety for the sake of convenience.
The Feed and Ejection Methods 
The feeding of stock and the ejection of finished
pieces can be performed by several methods involving a
variety of devices. The oldest and most basic is that of
manual feeding and ejection. In many instances, metal form-
ing systems incorporating early vintage presses in their
arrangements employ these types of feeding and ejection
12.
methods. In some cases, the die design or the size or
shape of the piece being produced may not allow any
alternative. In other cases, the decision may be related
to economic considerations on the part of the system's
designer/user. Regardless of the reason, this type of
operator participation in the system's production routine
substantially increases exposure to the point of operation
and thereby increases the potential for injury. In an
effort to reduce this exposure, various handtool devices
are available for piece handling. Such devices allow for
feeding and removal of work pieces while exposing only the
handtool to the die closure area. Handtools, however, are
by no means a cure-all. Their use is based more on operator
preference than system requirement.
Other manual participation methods include push feed-
ing, follow feeding and slide feeding. The devices used
in these methods all offer the same significant safety ad-
vantage of permitting manual feeding of stock from outside
the point of operation. Push feeding, one of the most
widely used methods in secondary operations, involves the
use of a slide mechanism. The piece to be worked is placed
in the slide which is then pushed between the dies. Follow
13.
feed devices, which include magazine-loaded types, provide
another popular secondary operation feeding method. Pieces
are released from the magazine and fed to the dies by
manual or mechanical operation of a release mechanism in-
tegral to the device. Slide feeding, used in both primary
and secondary operations, utilizes both mechanical slide
and gravity slide devices. As their names imply, one
method assists the piece along the slide by mechanical
means while the other takes advantage of gravitational
benefits.
In addition to these manual feeding methods, a variety
of automatic feed devices are usually employed in contin-
uous blanking and forming operations where strip stock is
used. In such arrangements, some type of powered or un-
powered stock reel is included to feed stock to the feed
device. Roll feeds, air feeds and mechanical grip feeds
are three of the most frequently employed methods. Each
of these devices is coordinated with the press to advance
the feed stock a fixed distance following each forming
stroke of the press ram. Such systems may also incorporate
a straightening device, located between the stock reel and
feed device, that flattens the strip stock being fed from
the reel to the feeding device at the press.
14.
Several methods of part ejection are commonly used in
the performance of the metal forming process. Achieving
proper parts ejection without requiring operator partici-
pation is not only beneficial from an efficiency standpoint,
but plays a substantial role in protecting the operator from
exposure to the point of operation during the unloading
segment of the production cycle of the press.
Knockout ejection, the most typical method used to
knock or kick the finished piece out of the upper die half,
employs knockout pins which are extended out of the die
during the upstroke of the press. The pins, in extending
above the surface of the die half, separate the piece from
the die surface. Smaller OBI presses frequently use this
method, although it is also used on larger presses when
blanking dies are being employed.
An air blast ejection arrangement is normally used on
presses involved in small parts production. In small parts
blanking and forming type processes, the pieces, being
light in weight, are blown out of the die into a chute or
box collecting arrangement. The air blast method is custom-
arily used in conjunction with knockout ejection. Whether
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used alone or in concert with the knockout method, this
technique utilizes a nozzle configuration which directs
a short duration blast of air at the finished part when
the press ram is making its upstroke. One variation of
this method employs holes drilled into the die as nozzles.
Gravity and mechanical ejection represent two other
standard part removal techniques. Gravity ejection is
normally used only in blanking operations where the die
configuration permits the finished blanks to drop through
the lower die half into a collecting arrangement.
Mechanical ejection, on the other hand, is more versa-
tile and frequently combines features included in the other
ejection methods. Standard mechanical ejection devices
include the latch, toggle and shuttle types. The latch
type is mounted on the upper die and lifts the finished
part out of the die on the upstroke of the press ram. The
toggle device is attached to both die halves and is used
in conjunction with a knockout arrangement. As the ram
is making its upstroke, this device swings into the point
of operation and catches the piece as it is ejected by the
knockout. The subsequent downstroke of the ram retracts
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the toggle device from the die closure area, and the piece
it is conveying falls by gravity to a collecting bin. This
device is a positive means of ejection, as it is operated
directly by the press ram. Another widely used mechanical
ejection device is the shuttle type which incorporates a
horizontal slide or table. The slide is propelled by a
chain drive or air cylinder arrangement and travels into
the point of operation during the upstroke of the press.
The finished part falls from the knockout onto the slide
(table) which then retracts from the die area and deposits
the part into a collecting arrangement. The shuttle de-
vice is operated electrically and is actuated through a
system of limit switches mounted on the press frame and
a cam arrangement mounted on the press ram.
Operating experience has shown that metal forming
systems which include full-revolution clutch equipped
presses and manual piece feeding methods represent system
arrangements most involved in point of operation injuries.
An analysis of 306 reports of point of operation accidents
occurring between July 1, 1975 and December 31, 1975 was
performed by the Office of Standards Development, Occu-
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pational Safety and Health Administration.1 The results
of that study verify the above statement. Their analysis
revealed that of the 306 accidents, 257 occurred during
normal operation. Of this number, 169 accidents involved
forming systems whose press components incorporated full-
revolution clutches. With respect to the method of feeding
employed, 115 of the 257 accidents resulted from manual
"hands in dies" feeding operations while an additional 79
accidents involved some type of manual "hands out of dies"
feeding method. In contrast to these figures, metal form-
ing systems incorporating presses equipped with part-revo-
lution clutches were involved in only 77 normal operation
accidents. Likewise, metal forming systems utilizing auto-
matic or semi-automatic feeding methods were involved in
only 33 of the 257 total injurious occurrences.
In light of the many variations and combinations of
components that may be combined to create a particular
metal forming system, it is evident that the individual
1U.S. Department of Labor, Occupational Safety and
Health Administration, Office of Standards Development,
Semi-Annual Report entitled Analysis of Reports of Point 
of Operation Injuries on Mechanical Power Presses,
(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1976),
pp. 1-11.
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function of the press, as with each of the other components,
has no practical relevance to the function of the total
system or the degree of safety that arrangement possesses
until the press is incorporated as a part of the complete
metal forming unit. Only after this has occurred can the
particular function of the press in that system be properly
defined and evaluated. This is especially significant with
respect to providing adequate system point of operation
safeguards.
As previously indicated, the press is a general pur-
pose machine. It is designed to be used with a variety of
dies of different forms and configurations, each of which
may be particular to one specific forming operation. Quite
often, a given die will be used for a short period of time
or only for a given run and then will be replaced by another
of dissimilar configuration. In addition to accepting a
variety of dies, the press can be adapted to various methods
of material feeding, part ejection and actuation depending
on the particular system's requirements. In the case of
early vintage presses whose designs usually provided only
a single means of actuation, the adaptation of the press
control to incorporate additional actuation capabilities
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may in turn have created new potential operating hazards.
Once the die set, means of actuation and methods of
material feeding and part ejection have been determined,
the press can then be properly equipped with a point of
operation safeguard configuration which will be compatible
with the total system and provide adequate protection for
the operator.
Failure to recognize the component function of the
press, mistakenly viewing it as the total system, has
fostered the belief that the press manufacturer should
assume full responsibility for providing the point of
operation safeguards required by the production system.
Such a view is inconsistent with the chronological pattern
of design and assembly associated with the system itself.
At the time of manufacture of the power press compon-
ent, the particular configuration of the complete metal
forming system into which the press will be included is
not known. As a result, the press manufacturer has no
factual means of determining what other components will be
utilized with his press. Without this information, the
final arrangement of these pieces of equipment in the system,
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as well as with respect to the press, cannot be clarified.
Therefore, from a practical engineering standpoint, the
press manufacturer cannot be responsible for providing
point of operation safeguards for a production system
which, at the time of shipment of the press, has not yet
been defined.
Safeguard designs based upon a "general purpose" or
"universal" philosophy cannot be expected to adequately
reflect the dictates of every system's specific character-
istics. In many cases, the incompatibility of such designs
may not only present operational difficulties, but, more
importantly, may in themselves create additional hazards
when incorporated into the system's production routine or
arrangement. It is for this reason that the advocacy of
"universal" safeguards, to be supplied as integral compon-
ents of power presses by their manufacturer's, represents
an ill-conceived and unsafe approach toward the providing
of adequate system point of operation safeguards for pro-
tection of the operator.
Specificity is an essential consideration in the pro-
vision of proper system point of operation safeguards. Each
metal forming system has certain particulars associated with
21.
it which make that system unique unto itself. These speci-
fic characteristics may occur as a result of the type of
components being employed, the manner in which the system
is arranged, or as a result of the particular forming
process being undertaken (e.g. special deep draw forming).
If they are to be effective, point of operation safeguards,
utilized by a system, must reflect that system's unique
qualities in their own design and construction. First,
therefore, to accomplish this satisfactorily, the metal
forming system where these safeguards will be employed,
must be fully defined.
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CHAPTER III
SYSTEM CONSIDERATIONS IN PROVIDING 
POINT OF OPERATION SAFEGUARDS 
The ultimate design of the metal forming system, in
component content and physical arrangement, is dependent
upon many "in house" production considerations to which
system component manufacturers are not privy. These pro-
duction factors serve as the basis for the design and
specification of the metal forming system and its point
of operation safeguards. Failure to properly consider such
system factors with respect to point of operation protection
can only increase the potential for operator injury.
The particular piece or part to be produced is a fun-
damental consideration in the assembly of any production
system. The design of the piece usually dictates the gen-
eral process operation that will be employed. This, in
turn, normally provides a guideline as to the components
which will be required in the system's final arrangement.
The general process to be performed also provides an in-
dication as to the alternatives available with respect to
the system's operating mode.
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Primary or blanking operations usually warrant more
component devices in the system than do secondary oper-
ations. However, primary routines generally lend them-
selves more readily to continuous operation than do secondary
types, by virtue of the characteristics of the process being
performed. The various dies used in such blanking operations
are designed to accomodate strip stock feeding, as opposed
to individual piece insertion, and to automatic, as opposed
to manual, part ejection. Thus, feeding of these systems
normally involves the inclusion of some type of powered or
unpowered stock reel as the means of supplying the strip
stock material. Compatible feed devices, such as roll,
air or mechanical grip, must also be included to convey
the stock to the dies. In addition, an appropriate method
of parts ejection is also necessary and, frequently, a
straightening device, used to flatten the strip stock before
contact with the particular feed device, is also customarily
provided.
Metal forming systems performing secondary or forming
operations normally involve fewer components than the pri-
mary types. In addition, the general forming nature of this
type of operation results in greater utilization of the
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manual function available from the operator. As a conse-
quence, these systems are of a greater concern from the
standpoint of point of operation exposure than the normal
continuous blanking type processes.
Early vintage mechanical power presses are more easily
assimilated into forming processes as these routines do not
require the degree of speed or continuous operation usually
desired in primary production processes. Thus, the utili-
zation of full-revolution clutch equipped presses is common,
consequently adding additional concern with respect to point
of operation injury.
As in blanking, the piece being formed in a secondary
operation dictates the die configuration which, in turn,
deterwines the method of part feeding and ejection to be
used. The least desirable method, of course, involves "hands
in dies" insertion and removal of parts. Unfortunately,
certain part configurations preclude the use of any other
method. For the most part, however, forming operations per-
mit the inclusion of a variety of "hands out of dies" feeding
and ejection devices, as well as various means of press
actuation.
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The overall plant arrangement can be a significant
factor in the final configuration and safety level of the
metal forming system. The area or position in the plant
layout designated for the metal forming system may well
affect the choice of system components where alternatives
are possible. Restrictions due to availability of space
or physical arrangement may necessitate employing an
alternative system arrangement not as productive or as
safe as the primary choice. Consider the following example:
A blanking process is to be performed and the metal forming
system is to be on continuous operation. The system is to
employ a stock reel in conjunction with a roll feed device
to convey material to the die set. Upon surveying the pro-
posed plant location for the system, it is observed that
physical limitations in the area do not provide sufficient
operating space to allow the use of a stock reel and roll
feed setup. A manual feeding arrangement is the only method
possible in the area provided. Since the production process
is required, an alternative system configuration involving
operator participation with single stroke press operation
and manual part feeding has to be utilized. This alterna-
tive system obviously presents greater potential danger to
the operator from the perspective of point of operation injury.
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Thus, it is important for the system designer/user to con-
sider both plant locale and space availability factors in
order to provide the best system arrangement from a safety
as well as a productivity standpoint. System component
manufacturers do not have the information required to pro-
vide such a design function.
The compatibility of the metal forming system's pro-
duction process with adjacent processes and work routines
is also a significant factor with respect to the system's
arrangement and degree of operating safety. For example,
a metal forming system employing "hands in dies" feeding
and ejection methods is significantly more hazardous to
its operator when located adjacent to noisy or disturbing
work processes or distracting work routines. A "hands in
dies" system arrangement requires the operator's undivided
attention. Varying levels of operator fatigue are nearly
always produced by the repetition associated with the pro-
cess performed by such a system. Surrounding distractions
can easily interrupt the operator's physical coordination
and mental attention to the system's production routine.
As a result, the potential for point of operation injury
is increased. Wherever possible, alternative locations for
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this type of metal forming system should be considered. If
no alternative is available, even greater attention must be
given to the providing of adequate system point of operation
safeguards. Such "in house" conditions cannot be foreseen
from any practical standpoint by the various system component
manufacturers. Therefore, the system designer/user must
bear the responsibility to provide the operator with ade-
quate point of operation protection.
Taking the above factors into account, a variety of
possible system configurations could still be designed to
accomplish the production process required. Some will be
more productive, while others will present more of a safety
hazard to the operator. The ultimate decision as to the
particular metal forming system's arrangement, including
the point of operation safeguards, remains that of the
system designer/user. A significant factor in that regard
is his production or operating philosophy. If the system
designer/user is safety oriented, he will be cognizant of
the various system alternatives available to accomplish a
particular production process and of the degrees of operator
safety associated with each. Wherever possible, he will
utilize continuous system arrangements so that operator
28.
participation is kept to a minimum. Where situations pre-
clude the use of continuous operation, every effort will be
made to include system components which will permit the
operator to function in a "hands out of dies" system arrange-
ment. When "hands in dies" feeding and ejection are re-
quired, proper handtools will be readily available for use.
Most importantly, adequate and suitable point of operation
sageguards for this, as well as the aforementioned arrange-
ments, will be integral to these systems' designs.
The foregoing tangible and intangible production factors
or considerations serve to finalize the component categories
which must be represented in the design of the metal forming
system. The specific die set required for the production of
the part desired, although a system component, serves to
further limit both the possible arrangement configurations
of the system and the alternative choices of devices avail-
able within each of the other component categories needed
to perform the production process under consideration. The
die configuration will indicate its degree of adaptability
or compatibility to various feeding and parts ejection ar-
rangements and will essentially define the range of alterna-
tive devices in these component categories that may be
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employed in the particular system. The alternatives avail-
able with respect to component arrangement in the system are
also reflective of the particular die set being utilized.
Directional considerations pertaining to the feeding of
stock and the ejection of parts must be compatible with the
provisions included in the die configuration for those
functions. As a result, the devices included to perform
these functions must be positioned so that they will be
properly oriented with respect to the particular sections
of the die set pertinent to these operations.
The particular die configuration utilized in the system
also affects the actuation devices that might be used and
the mode of system operation. For example, the die set
used for a primary operation, such as stamping parts from
strip stock, usually permits a continuous mode of system
operation which only requires the operator to provide a
sustained signal from a given actuation device. In contrast,
another die set used to perform a primary trimming operation
may require the operator to manually insert the piece into
the dies, maintain it in a stable position, as well as actu-
ate the press during the trimming process. As a result, the
press and system must be operated on a single stroke basis.
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In addition, since the operator's hands are occupied during
the trimming operation, a foot-type actuation device is re-
quired. Although these two metal forming systems are per-
forming the same category of operation, the particular die
set being employed in each of these primary processes has
resulted in significantly different system arrangements
and operating modes.
The component hardware constituting the particular
metal forming system and its physical arrangement are the
end result of the system designer/user's decisions with
respect to the above considerations, with one exception.
The point of operation safeguards for this finalized system
have not yet been provided. Heretofore, appropriate con-
sideration in this important area of system safety was not
possible since the system did not exist. However, once the
physical components and their arrangement in the system have
been determined, the operational requirements of each com-
ponent and the relationship of those functional aspects to
the system's operation can be clarified.
It is essential that such component operating charac-
teristics be considered when providing point of operation
protection for the system. Guards must reflect the partic-
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ular characteristics of the system if they are to be ef-
fective. Such protective configurations must permit proper
operation of the system and simultaneously prevent unsafe
access to and injury from the point of operation. The
point of operation guards provided must make the necessary
physical provisions in their configurations for the feed-
ing and ejection methods being used, access for remedial
procedures such as removal of jammed pieces and reasonable
visibility to facilitate monitoring of the production
process. At the same time, however, these guards must pro-
vide the protection necessary to prevent access to the
point of operation. The safety devices employed must
properly protect the operator while also providing him
the mobility required to adequately perform his activities
in the system's production routine. Satisfactory accom-
plishment of their safety function can only be realized
if these guards and devices reflect the particular operating
characteristics of the system utilizing them.
Various categories of point of operation guards and
devices are available which, through operating experience,
have been found to be effective when properly used. Before
reviewing these categories, it is first important to formally
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clarify the distinctions between a point of operation guard
and a point of operation device. Section 2, paragraph 2.21
of the American National Standards Institute's ANSI B11.1 -
1971 Standard, entitled "Guard," defines a guard as follows:
"The word guard means a barrier that prevents
entry of the operator's hands or fingers into
the point of operation."2
Paragraph 2.8 of the same Section, entitled "Device,"
defines a device as follows:
"The word device means a press control or
attachment that:
1) restrains the operator from inadvertently
reaching into the point of operation, or
2) prevents normal press operation if the
operator's hands are inadvertently with-
in the point of operation, or
3) automatically withdraws the operator's
hands, if the operator's hands are inad-
vertently within the point of operation
as the dies close."3
With reference to point of operation guards, para-
2American National Standards Institute, American 
National Standard Safety Requirements for the Construction,
Care and Use of Mechanical Power Presses, B11.1 - 1971




graph 5.2 of Section 5, entitled "Point of Operation Guards,"
requires that among other provisions:
"Every point of operation guard shall meet the
following design, construction, application
and adjustment requirements:
1) it shall prevent entry of hands or fingers
into the point of operation [die closure area]
by reaching through, over, under or around
the guard, and . .
3) it shall, in itself, create no pinch point
between the guard and moving machine parts, and
4) it shall utilize fasteners not readily re-
movable by operator, so as to minimize the
possibility of misuse or removal of essential
parts, and
5) it shall facilitate its inspection, and
6) it shall offer maximum visibility of the
point of operation consistent with the
other requirements. "4
Section 5, paragraph 5.3, entitled "Point of Operation
Devices," states:
"A point of operation device shall protect the
operator by:
1) preventing or stopping normal stroking of
the press, or both, if the operator's hands
are inadvertently placed in the point of
operation, or
2) preventing the operator from inadvertently
reaching into the point of operation or
withdrawing his hands, if they are inad-
vertently located in the point of operation
as the dies close, or
4Ibid., p. 34.
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3) preventing the operator from inadvertently
reaching into the point of operation at all
times, or
4) requiring application of both of the oper-
ator's hands to machine operating controls
during the die closing portion of the press
stroke, or
5) locating single cycle operating controls
so that the slide [ram] completes its down-
ward travel before the operator's hands can
inadvertently reach into the point of oper-
ation."5
Section 1910.217, entitled "Mechanical Power Presses,"
of the Occupational Safety and Health Administration's
Occupational Safety and Health Standards embraces similar
requirements.
The category of point of operation guards includes
four basic types: fixed barrier, die closure, interlocked
barrier, and adjustable barrier guards.
The Fixed Barrier Guard 
The fixed barrier guard protects the point of operation
by completely enclosing the hazardous area with an enclosure
type shield or barrier secured to the frame or bolster plate
of the press component. Usually constructed of metal or a
5Ibid., p. 37,
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combination of metal and plexiglas, the fixed barrier guard
is designed for strength and prolonged use, is simple in
design, permanent in installation, highly effective, and
requires minimal maintenance. It is particularly prefer-
able since it can be designed and constructed to meet
specific system characteristics while still providing a
positive guarding function. The fixed barrier guard is an
especially effective means of protecting the point of
operation of metal forming systems employing continuous
operation or "hands out of dies" feeding and ejection methods.
However, some disadvantages of this guard include the re-
duction of visibility and, in many cases, its physical re-
moval for the performance of remedial adjustments, mainten-
ance or repairs in the vicinity of the die closure area.
In its application, the fixed barrier guard can only pro-
vide adequate protection if its configuration is tailored
to the system's needs and this can only be accomplished by
first defining the system. The specific needs of a given
system prevent the providing of a proper fixed barrier guard
on the press component prior to its inclusion in the system
arrangement.
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The Die Closure Guard 
The die closure guard is similar to the fixed barrier
guard except that it is attached to the die shoe or die
assembly base rather than the press. Like the fixed barrier
guard, this guard is also stationary and, in many cases, is
attached to and made a permanent part of a particular die
set. This is advantageous from the standpoint that the die
closure area (point of operation) will always be provided
with point of operation protection, except during die set-
ting procedures. While the die closure guard is effective,
it does limit a given die set to a particular feeding and
ejection routine which is disadvantageous in situations
where dies permit alternate arrangements of these functions.
Like the fixed barrier, the die closure guard must be fitted
to the system in order to be adequately compatible. It is
important that ram travel of the press be considered when
providing this type of guarding configuration. In particu-
lar, the arrangement must insure that the ram, at its upper
most position, will be at least one inch lower than the top
of the die closure guard. If the ram is higher than the
top of the guard, a shearing hazard will be created when
the ram descends during operation. Prior to its design and
construction, this type of guard requires specification of
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the die set, press, and feeding and ejection component
devices. Without this system formalization, an adequate
guard configuration cannot be provided.
The Interlocked Barrier Guard 
The interlocked barrier guard is attached to the press
frame or bolster and encloses the point of operation in a
manner similar to the fixed type. This guard, however, is
equipped with hinged or movable sections, each of which is
interlocked by mechanical or electrical means with the press
clutch control. Thus, removal or positioning of the movable
portion(s) of this guard out of the operating or safe posi-
tion, will prevent operation of the press. It is important
to understand that the hinged and movable sections of this
type of guarding configuration are intended for use as
access ways for setup, die adjustments and the performance
of other similar remedial procedures. They are not provided
or intended for use as a means of feeding or parts ejection
during the regular operation of the press and system. If
used in its proper capacity, the interlocked barrier guard
is an appropriate alternative to the two previous guards,
since it provides a greater degree of operator flexibility.
However, there are disadvantages. This guard's success
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is predicated on careful maintenance and adjustment of the
interlock switches or devices. Also, like most interlocking
arrangements, the susceptibility to operator interference
with or bypassing of the interlock devices, reduces the
safety potential of this type of guard. In addition, the
interlocked barrier guard does not provide positive protec-
tion against a mechanical repeat (unwanted stroke) of the
press as do the fixed barrier or die closure guards. If
properly adjusted and maintained, however, this guard can
provide satisfactory protection for the operator. In metal
forming systems using presses with full-revolution clutches,
this type of guard is only permitted to be used when the
press is operated in the single stroke mode. Proper appli-
cation of this interlocked barrier guard configuration re-
quires adequate consideration of the system's components
as well as its operating modes.
The Adjustable Barrier Guard 
The adjustable barrier guard is attached to the press
bed, bolster plate or the die shoe (base). This configura-
tion differs from the fixed barrier type in that the pro-
tection barrier or shield of this guard is adjustable
whereas the fixed barrier is not. The adjustable barrier
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is usually constructed of individual vertical sections of
bar stock, each of which can be positioned and secured where
required. The operator should be required to use a mechani-
cal tool as a proper means of securing each bar. The ad-
justable barrier guard has the advantage of greater adapt-
ability than the aforementioned guards and is generally
considered to be as effective as the fixed type if adjusted
and secured properly. However, this guard is quite susceptible
to operator tampering and misadjustment. Although the ad-
justable barrier guard is more versatile than the other types,
its effective application requires compatibility with the
complexion of the particular metal forming system involved,
since the guard can be attached to either the press or die
component. As a result, until the system is defined and
these components are specified, the particular configuration
of the adjustable barrier guard and its mounting location
cannot be properly determined.
The most effective types of point of operation devices,
commonly used to reduce exposure to the die closure area,
are: the gate or movable barrier, pull-out or pull-back,
hold-out or restraint, sweep or push-away, presence-sensing,
two-hand control, and the two-hand trip.
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The Gate or Movable Barrier Device 
The gate or movable barrier device is designed to
enclose the point of operation before the press can be
operated, and stop the press if the gate is opened during
operation. This device usually consists of a fixed barrier
enclosure with a movable section permitting access to the
point of operation. The movable barrier or gate section
of the device is interlocked with the press control to
prevent operation unless it is in the proper protective
position. However, the device cannot protect against a
mechanical repeat of the press. Although similar in de-
scription to the interlocked barrier guard, the gate's
usage is significantly different. The interlocked section
of the barrier guard is provided only as a means for gain-
ing access to the point of operation for the purpose of
performing remedial procedures. It is not provided as an
access way to be employed as part of the normal production
routine. The movable barrier section of the gate device,
however, is provided as the normal means of access to the
point of operation to accomplish part feeding and, in many
cases, ejection of material. Its operation, therefore, is
an integral part of the production cycle. The gate or
movable barrier device is an effective means of operator
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protection when properly adjusted and maintained. This
device, as with all configurations employing interlocking
designs, however, is susceptible to operator interference
or bypassing as well as improper or unsafe operation due
to inadequate adjustment. It is further restricted in its
use in metal forming systems using full-revolution clutch
equipped presses. While the interlock design is capable
of preventing engagement of the full-revolution clutch when
the gate is not properly positioned, once the press is
actuated, the stroke cycle cannot be stopped even if the
gate is moved out of the "operate" or protective position.
Thus, when the movable barrier device is used in this type
of system, the press must be operated in the single stroke
mode. In addition, the device must be applied so that once
the press is tripped, the operator cannot open the gate and
gain access to the point of operation prior to the press ram
completing its full downward stroke. The full protective
potential of the movable barrier device is better realized
when used in conjunction with presses equipped with part-
revolution clutch mechanisms. Proper usage of this device
also requires that the production routine of the system be
considered in its design and that the device be compatible
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with feeding and ejection methods. If the gate or movable
barrier device annoys or interferes with the operator's
routine to any significant extent, it will only increase
the possibility of the operator bypassing the interlock
protection provided. Proper consideration of the system's
operation can reduce this potentially hazardous possibility.
The Pull-out or Pull-back Device 
The pull-out or pull-back is a widely used protective
device which is adaptable to many metal forming system ar-
rangements. The design of this device includes hand or
wrist attachments which are connected by a system of pulleys
and cables to the press ram or upper die. The cables are
normally adjusted so that when the ram descends, the oper-
ator's hands are pulled back and clear of the point of
operation before the dies close. When the ram is in its
top position, access is permitted. The pull-back device
can also be adjusted so that the operator is never permitted
access to the die closure area. This method of adjustment
requires the use of a handtool if manual feeding and/or
ejection is being performed and, although more restrictive
and inconvenient, does increase the safety potential of the
device. Although quite adaptable to varying system arrange-
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ments and operating conditions, the pull-back's potential
for providing adequate protection for the operator is based
upon two tenuous criteria. First, the operator must use
the device. Pull-backs are not interlocked with the press
control in any way and their usage, therefore, is discretion-
ary. This is always an unsatisfactory characteristic for
a protective device to possess since aspects such as con-
venience of operator movement, disregard for safe work
practices, and improper supervision are able to directly
affect the protective potential of this type of device.
Secondly, even when used, pull-backs require unusually good
adjustment and maintenance in order to adequately function
in a protective capacity. Slight alterations in a specific
system operation, frequently require readjustments of this
device not required on other types of safeguards. However,
pull-backs can be effective when properly adjusted and main-
tained and a conscientious effort is undertaken to insure
that they are properly used. Their application must be
predicated on knowing the metal forming system's composi-
tion and mode of production. The system requirements on
operator mobility are of primary concern when pull-backs
are considered. If pull-backs are employed, the arrange-
ment of system components may create an excessive obstruction
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of operator work space which might not result from an alter-
nate protective configuration. In order to avoid such dif-
ficulties and to insure an effective level of operator
protection, the system must be fully defined and understood
in order to properly determine the applicability of this
type of device in the particular production routine being
performed.
The Hold-out or Restraint Device 
The hold-out or restraint device, like the pull-back,
includes attachments for the operator's hands or wrists.
Unlike pull-backs, however, the hold-out's cables are se-
cured and adjusted in such a manner that when the attach-
ments are worn, the operator is restrained from reaching
into the point of operation at all times. As with pull-
backs, the use of this device is discretionary and, thus,
presents the same undesirable characteristics in that re-
gard. Restraints, however, provide a more positive means
of protection than pull-backs in that their correct adjust-
ment is more easily achieved and maintained. As restraints
are designed to be especially restrictive, the operator's
role in the production process must permit him to work with-
in the confines the device allows. If not provided with
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adequate mobility and comfort, the operator will most likely
not wear them. This occurrence is especially prevalent in
systems where manual methods of feeding and parts ejection
are used. If the restraints obstruct the operator's ease
in placement and removal of parts, he will, out of necessity,
be forced to work without them and, therefore, lose their
protective function. In order to determine if the appli-
cation of this device will result in an effective means of
point of operation protection, the system designer/user must
insure that the restraint is compatible with the system's
components and the production cycle.
The Sweep or Push-away Device 
The sweep or push-away device consists of a movable
barrier mounted on a sweep arm, which is normally attached
to or actuated by the press ram. In operation, the leading
edge of the sweep barrier moves across the front of the
point of operation as the ram descends, pushing the oper-
ator's hands clear of the die area. The trailing edge of
the barrier simultaneously restricts access to the die set
prior to the completion of the press ram's full downstroke.
An alternate manner of operation can be used where the
sweeping action is initiated prior to actuation of the
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press clutch and descending of the ram. The use of a sweep
device also requires partial enclosures on each side of
the point of operation, to prevent access to the point of
operation by reaching around or behind the sweep device.
Application of this device to the metal forming system re-
quires careful consideration of the system's press and die
components. With respect to the press, the system designer/
user must insure that the action of the sweep does not, in
itself, create additional shear or impact hazards, which
can occur due to the location of tie rods or other portions
of the machine. The system designer/user must also be a-
ware of the width of the die set being used in the system.
If the die set is too wide, the sweep device will not have
the side-to-side operating range needed to prevent access
to the die closure area at all points during its travel.
Another system consideration concerns the compatibility of
the sweep's direction of travel (left-to-right or right-to-
left when facing the press) with the operator's dexterity.
If the operator is right-handed, any normal feeding or part
ejection will most likely be accomplished using his right
hand. In this situation, right-to-left travel of the sweep
device is required in order to insure contact with the
operator's hand as soon as the ram begins motion or the
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clutch is actuated. Likewise, if the operator is left-hand-
ed, left-to-right sweep travel is necessary. Although advan-
tageous in permitting complete access to the point of oper-
ation for the purpose of feeding and removal of parts and
for the performance of remedial procedures, the sweep device
has several disadvantages. Unless it is adjusted to the
proper height and sweep speed and unless the operator's
hands are in the normal position during press operation,
the device will not properly prevent access to the point of
operation. Because of these disadvantages, OSHA has pro-
hibited the use of this device as a primary means of safe-
guarding since December 31, 1976. However, when employed
in conjunction with another point of operation safeguard,
it can be used in a secondary capacity. In considering use
of this type of device, its operational disadvantages must
be evaluated in light of the system's operation as well as
its compatibility with the primary guard or device being
used before its applicability as an effective secondary means
of point of operation protection can be determined.
The Presence-sensing Device
The presence-sensing device most commonly used as a
means of point of operation protection is the photoelectric
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type, which consists of a light beam source and an electric
eye receiver. The electric eye is interlocked with the
press control circuit to prevent or stop press operation if
the light beam is interrupted. While effective if properly
adjusted and maintained, this device can only be used in
metal forming systems with part-revolution clutch equipped
presses. Although this device will prevent initiating
operation of a full-revolution press, it cannot stop oper-
ation once the clutch has been engaged for a cycle. When
used with part-revolution presses, care must be taken to
insure that the operating cycle speed of the press is not
too great that the stroke cannot be stopped quickly on
command of the photoelectric device. The device does not
protect against a mechanical repeat of the press. Aside
from requiring regular maintenance and adjustment, the
presence-sensing device is initially quite expensive. In
addition, the method of feeding and ejection of parts must
be considered, as more than one device might be required
in order to provide the protection necessary as a result
of these factors.
The Two-hand Control Device 
The two-hand control device can be used as a point of
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operation device as well as a means of press actuation.
This type of device normally consists of two palm buttons
electrically integrated into the press control circuit.
In order to use such a device in this protective capacity,
the press involved can only be equipped with a part-revolu-
tion clutch. In addition, the device must require the con-
current use of both hands to start and maintain the press
stroke at least until the ram has completed its full down-
ward travel. The two-hand control is very effective since
both of the operator's hands are needed to operate the de-
vice and, therefore, cannot be in the point of operation
when the press ram is descending. Although advantageous
from the standpoints of requiring only minor maintenance
and being inexpensive to install, the two-hand control
device has two disadvantages. First, the system can be
circumvented unless equipped with an anti-repeat provision
which requires complete release of both palm buttons be-
tween press strokes. Secondly, this device does not protect
against a mechanical repeat. Use of the two-hand control
device in the metal forming system, in addition to insuring
that the press component is equipped with a part-revolution
clutch, requires that the operator have both hands free
during the production stroke of the press. If the particu-
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lar system's operation requires the operator to use either
hand to manually stabilize the part being worked, as in a
trimming operation, the two-hand control device would not
be appropriate. It is important that the press, as well as
the production routine, be properly evaluated when consider-
ing use of this device.
The Two-hand Trip Device 
The two-hand trip device is mechanically or pneumatic-
ally integrated into the press control system, and performs
its function in a manner similar to the two-hand control,
except that it is used on presses equipped with full-revolu-
tion clutches. While requiring the concurrent actuation of
both tripping means to initiate the press stroke, this de-
vice differs from the two-hand control since the device
need not be held actuated in order to continue the stroke
once the clutch has been engaged. Since the operator is
not required to maintain his hands on the tripping means
during the total downward stroke of the ram, proper location
of the two-hand trip device is important. The device must
be positioned so the distance between it and the die closure
area does not provide the operator sufficient time to actu-
ate the device and reach the point of operation before the
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ram has completed the full downward portion of its stroke.
The evaluation of the metal forming system's production
routine and its press component, in particular, are re-
quired in order to determine the suitability of the two-
hand trip for use as a means of point of operation pro-
tection. In this regard, the press component must be of
high speed and short stroke, with a full-revolution clutch,
and the system arrangement and production routine must per-
mit the operator's hands to be free to actuate the press
cycle. In addition, the system must provide a location for
installation of the two-hand trip device which will prevent
the operator from reaching the point of operation during the
die closure portion of the press stroke.
In order to gain adequate advantage of the protective
safety function offered by any of the above guards or de-
vices, that safeguard must be compatible with the particular
production routine involved. This routine is defined by
the content and arrangement of the metal forming system and
is the end result of the "in house" production decisions
of the system designer/user. Until such decisions are
formalized and translated into the system's physical pro-
duction equipment, a meaningful and effective approach to
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the providing of necessary point of operation protection is
not possible.
Individual component guarding, prior to any definition
of the metal forming system's design or arrangement, has
been advocated as a viable alternative to a system approach
in the provision of point of operation protection. The
component approach, however, has a number of undesirable
and, in many cases, hazardous ramifications. Evaluation
of each component on its own merits, without regard for
its relationship with other equipment, may permit the
inclusion of adequate protection for the particular compon-
ent involved. Unfortunately, the individual component is
not operated as a single, isolated unit, but is used in
conjunction with other related pieces of equipment. Thus,
the component's functional application, as well as the re-
sulting relationships between it and associated equipment,
cannot possibly be reflected in the individual point of
operation protection provided. Protection which may be
adequate for one component, may be totally inadequate for
the system in which it is included. Safeguard incompatibil-
ities may substantially reduce the speed and efficiency of
the system's operation or prevent its production routine
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altogether. More importantly, the inclusion of such safe-
guard arrangements may adversely affect system safety by
either creating additional hazards or by reducing the
effectiveness of other components' safeguards.
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CHAPTER IV
PRESENT CODES AND STANDARDS 
AND THE METAL FORMING SYSTEM
Present authoritative codes and standards fail to
recognize or reflect the general purpose nature and com-
ponent function of the mechanical power press as one element
of the metal forming system. Their misinterpretation of
the press as a self-contained, complete production unit,
has resulted in the omission of any consideration of aspects
relating to the nature or function of the metal forming
system and its relationship to the safety of the operator.
As a result, the viability and validity of these authori-
tative sources as instructionary and regulatory documents
is substantially reduced.
By failing to recognize that the metal forming system
consists of more than the power press component, the codes
and standards include no instructional recommendations,
guidelines or requirements with respect to the responsibili-
ties of individual component manufacurers toward the system.
There are no recommended or required specifications relating
to design configurations or types and grades of materials
to be used in the construction of system components. Of
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particular significance in this regard is the absence of
any requirements with respect to maximum expected component
life. At present, there appears to be no limitation as to
the required life of the press or any of the other system's
components.
Similarly, the codes and standards provide no system-
oriented requirements or recommendations with reference to
the responsibilities of the system designer/user (usually
the employer). No recognition is given to specific para-
meters or guidelines with respect to the design, content,
arrangement or operation of the metal forming system. The
individual component designers do not have the system in-
formation available at the time of the design and manufac-
ture of their products to accomplish these tasks. Further,
no stipulations with respect to the press, for example, are
set forth to regulate its use or non-use in a particular
production configuration. As a result, the design and
arrangement of the metal forming system and its degree of
operating safety are based on the designer/user's own cri-
teria. This is especially significant when the system de-
signer/user is formulating a production routine involving
the use of early vintage system components in conjunction
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with a "hands in dies" feeding and ejection method. Such
systems do not have the benefits of technological advances
in the areas of machine design, system control, and operat-
ing safety which are reflected in the more advanced compon-
ents of newer arrangements. Thus, it is all the more essen-
tial to provide the system designer/user with the guidance
necessary to insure that the system created will provide a
safe and acceptable means of accomplishing the production
process being performed.
Proper point of operation safeguards are essential to
the providing of such a safe and acceptable metal forming
system. Satisfactory fulfillment of this protective func-
tion initially requires a thorough and effective analysis
of the system to determine the type of guards and devices
necessary to afford the operator the protection required.
Once this determination has been made, the system designer/
user is then able to provide, properly install and adjust
the particular guard or device best suited for the system's
characteristics. The codes and standards include no in-
structional information, however, to assist the system de-
signer/user in these endeavors. No specifications recommend
or set forth a formal method of system analysis. In addition,
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no design or material requirements are provided to insure
uniform standards of strength, quality, durability and per-
formance for point of operation guards and devices. The
codes and standards neither address themselves to any speci-
fications regarding installation methods and materials nor
prescribe procedures for insuring proper guard or device
adjustment and functional testing prior to "on line" use
by the operator. These omissions serve to open the "flood
gates" of interpretation in an area where "specifics" are
essential.
A short review of the contents of applicable authori-
tative sources will amply illustrate the aforementioned
observations. The recognized and accepted authoritative
power press standards are the American National Standards
Institute's Standard ANSI B11.1 - 1971, entitled "Safety
Requirements for the Construction, Care and Use of Mech-
anical Power Presses," and the Occupational Safety and
Health Administration's Occupational Safety and Health
Standards, Sections 1910.211(d) and 1910.217, respectively
entitled, "Definitions" and "Mechanical Power Presses." As
the OSHA Standards embrace the same provisions and intent
as ANSI B11.1, an analysis of the ANSI Standard will pro-
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vide a valid indication of the misinterpreted nature of the
power press that pervades the provisions of these documents.
At the outset, Section 1, paragraph 1.1, of ANSI B11.1 -
1971, entitled "Scope," serves to portray the metal forming
system as a single machine by stipulating that:
"The requirements of this standard apply only
to those mechanically powered machines that
shear, punch, form or assemble metal or other
materials by means of tools or dies attached
to slides, commonly referred to as mechanical
power presses.1t6
Paragraph 1.2, entitled "Purpose," further emphasizes the
lack of recognition of the existance of the metal forming
system by clarifying the Standard's intent as follows:
"The purpose of this standard is to establish
safety requirements with respect to the con-
struction, care, and use of mechanical power
presses. "7
As is clearly indicated in these two paragraphs, this Stand-
ard does not recognize or address itself to the relationship




is a component part.
The Standard's failure to provide guidelines or re-
quirements specifying the proper procedure for conducting
an adequate and suitable system analysis for the purpose
of providing point of operation guards or devices is il-
lustrated in Section 5 of the Standard. Paragraph 5.1,
entitled "Responsibility," sets forth the following blanket
statement which represents the Standard's instructional
content with respect to this most important evaluative
function:
"It shall be the responsibility of the employer
[system designer/user] to provide and insure
the usage of either a point of operation guard
or a properly applied and adjusted point of
operation device on every opeption performed
on a mechanical power press."°
Such generalized treatment of this most significant aspect
of operator protection cannot possibly provide the instruc-
tion necessary to insure that an equivalent standard of
evaluation will be employed by all system designer/users
when providing their systems with adequate point of oper-
ation guards or devices.
8Ibid., p. 33.
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Paragraph 5.2, entitled "Point of Operation Guards,"
sets forth certain general "design, construction, application
and adjustment requirements"9 for point of operation guards
and then further clarifies these requirements for specific
types. These provisions, however, are actually functional
requirements to be satisfied by a point of operation guard.
Functional requirements are not sufficient to insure proper
choice of materials for fabrication, specifications of
methods of installation, or procedures for proper adjusting
and testing of guards prior to use. Phrases such as in
paragraph 5.2(4), "it shall utilize fasteners not readily
removable by operator," or in paragraph 5.2.2, "shall be
attached securely to," or in paragraph 5.2.3, "shall be
interlocked with," 10 are ambiguous and do not instruct in
the specifics of "how" to accomplish the functional require-
ments of this Section of the Standard. Similarly phrased
functional requirements are set forth with respect to point
of operation devices in paragraph 5.3. No section of the
Standard actually provides design, construction or install-
9Ibid,, p. 34.
1°Ibid., p. 34; p. 34; P. 36.
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ation specifications for the guards or devices covered or
procedures for their proper adjustment prior to use.
Concerning responsibilities of system component manu-
facturers, Section 3 of the Standard does address itself
to certain responsibilities of the press manufacturer.
However, the provision and intent of this portion of the
Standard is again essentially functional in nature. Further,
no recognition from either a design specification or func-
tional performance standpoint is made with respect to the
press as a general purpose, component machine or to its
relationship in the metal forming system. Included as part
of Section 3 is the extent of the Standard's coverage of
requirements pertinent to the reconstruction or modification
of the press component. Paragraph 3.1.2, entitled "Recon-
struction and Modification," stipulates:
"It shall be the responsibility of any person
reconstructing or modifying a mechanical power
press to do so in accordance with Section 3 of
this standard."11
The Standard's instructions with reference to reconstruction
or modification of the press component provide no guidance
1 lIbid., p. 22.
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from a design or construction specification standpoint. In
addition, there are no requirements governing the types or
degrees of alterations that are either permitted or prohibit-
ed. This is especially significant since most reconstruction
or modification is done without the knowledge or assistance
of the press manufacturer. As such, these alterations are
performed without a full awareness of all the design and con-
struction considerations which were incorporated into the
manufacture of the original machine. As a result, modifi-
cations and reconstructions of presses provide the greatest
potential for the creation of operational malfunctions which
are causally related to a significant number of point of
operation injuries. It is imperative that the Standard pro-
vide the guidance necessary to insure that such alterations
will be performed within regulated limits.
The omissions which have occurred in the codes and
standards as a result of the press-system misinterpretation
have had significant effects with respect to operator safety
in the metal forming system. Several accident studies con-
cerning point of operation injuries are illustrative of the
code's and standard's failure to provide adequate guidance
in this regard.
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Liberty Mutual Insurance Company, in the late 1960's,
conducted a study of 389 high cost power press accidents
which produced the following: 12
A. 135 accidents resulted from no guards or
safety devices being provided. Most of
these accidents occurred during feeding
and removal of the workpiece from the die
when the operator accidently tripped the
press.
B. 50 accidents resulted from not using the
guards or safety devices provided. Of these,
26 accidents involved pull-back devices, 17
involved two-hand control devices and 7
accidents resulted from removal of barrier
guards.
C. 96 accidents resulted from guards or safety
devices not providing adequate protection
while being used. Of these, 46 accidents
involved two-hand control devices, 25 in-
volved sweep devices, 20 involved barrier
guards or gates and 5 accidents resulted
from inadequate pull-back devices.
D. 59 accidents resulted from guards or safety
devices being improperly adjusted, main-
tained or installed. Of these, 33 accidents
were attributed to improper adjustment, 17
to maintenance and 9 accidents to improper
installation of the particular guard or device.
12Joseph W. Hart, "Power Press Accidents - A Manage-
ment Problem," Metal Stamping, July 1969, pp. 16 - 19 and
"II Causes of Point of Operation Injuries," Federal Resister 
39, No. 233, 3 December 1974, 41842.
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E. 49 accidents occurred during set up, test-
ing or repair procedures. Of these, 23
accidents occurred during die setting, 10
during testing and 16 accidents occurred
while performing remedial repairs.
Of the 389 accidents investigated, 340 of these were re-
lated specifically to point of operation protection pro-
vided for normal production operation.
In November, 1975, the Office of Standard Development,
U. S. Department of Labor, Occupational Safety and Health
Administration, issued a report entitled "Investigation and
Analysis of Fifty Reports of Injury to Operators of Mech-
anical Power Presses." This study involved OSHA's investi-
gation of 45 power press accidents (5 accidents were not
considered relevant). Tabulation of the conditions involved
in these accidents indicated the following: (Note: These
accident totals reflect the fact that many of the accidents
are included in more than one category.)13
A. 40 accidents involved pull-out safety de-
vices, two-hand control devices, sweep
13U. S. Department of Labor, Occupational Safety and
Health Administration, Office of Standards Development,
Investigation and Analysis of Fifty Reports of Injury to
Operators of Mechanical Power Presses, (Washington, D.C.:
Government Printing Office, 1975) pp. 1-29.
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devices, fixed barrier guards and movable
barrier devices that were either improperly
installed or adjusted or were bypassed or
ignored by the operator.
B. 5 accidents occurred when no safeguards were
provided.
C. 15 accidents involved inadvertent actuation
of the press. This included unintentional
tripping of the press by foot trips and two-
hand devices which were not properly located.
D. 4 accidents resulted from failures of press
braking systems. (It was determined that of
the 45 accidents analyzed, in only one in-
stance could brake monitoring have been used
to any advantage.)
E. 41 accidents involved worker factors such as
unsafe acts, lack of operating experience,
and second party contributions.
F. 12 accidents were related to inadequate hand-
tools.
G. 14 accidents involved poor maintenance.
H. 23 accidents related to poor supervision.
I. 14 accidents involved the use of incentive
pay systems.
J. 9 accidents were related to the lack of
safety rules.
As indicated in the above, conditions of improper install-
ation, adjustment, or use of guards or devices were involved
in 40 of the 45 accidents analyzed.
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The Office of Standards Development, U. S. Department
of Labor, Occupational Safety and Health Administration,
issued a semi-annual report dated January 15, 1976, entitled
"Analysis of Reports of Point of Operation Injuries on Mech-
anical Power Presses." This study, which covered the in-
clusive period of July 1 to December 31, 1975, involved the
analysis of 306 power press accident reports. Of this total,
257 of these accidents occurred during normal production
operation and 49 occurred during setup and/or maintenance
operations. Summarization of the accident causes/contri-
buting factors cited in the 257 normal operation accidents
indicated the following: (Note: The accident totals re-
flect the fact that many of the accidents are included in
more than one category.) 14
A. 123 accidents involved guards or safety
devices that were either improperly worn,
adjusted or inadequate or were defective,
removed or bypassed.
E. 65 accidents occurred where no safeguards
were provided.
C. 57 accidents involved failure to use hand-
tools when cleaning scrap or jammed parts,
14U. S. Department of Labor, Point of Operation In-
juries, pp. 1-11
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or feeding material in the die area.
D. 40 accidents involved press control (elec-
trical or mechanical defects) and included
brake failures, broken cams, valve failures,
die failures, electrical shorts, etc. Main-
tenance factors were also included. (This
category was a catch-all in nature and did
not reflect any specific accident trends.)
Of the 257 accidents which occurred during normal production
operation, nearly half of these (123 accidents) were caused
by or specifically related to deficiencies in the point of
operation safeguards which were provided. This number does
not include the 65 accidents where no safeguards were pro-
vided.
The results of these studies are clearly indicative
of the unsatisfactory caliber of the point of operation
protection presently being employed. This is a direct re-
flection of the manner in which the system designer/user
has evaluated the metal forming system to determine its
safeguard needs, provided for the design and construction
of the guards and devices necessary, secured the installation
of these configurations and provided for their adjustment
and testing prior to use. The system designer/user's un-
satisfactory level of performance in these areas must be
considered a reflection of the codes' and standards' failure
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to provide instruction and guidance with respect to a metal
forming system approach to safeguarding. This omission has
its origin in the misinterpretation of the true nature and
function of the press in the production unit.
While the lack of system guidance is of major concern,
it is important to remember that these accident studies
also reflect the level of effectiveness that the codes and
standards are achieving as a result of their providing only
performance or functional requirements with respect to point
of operation safeguards. It is evident that definite design,
construction and installation specifications, as well as
specific adjustment and testing procedures, are also neces-
sary if present codes and standards are to be applied effec-
tively.
The effects or consequences of inadequacies and omis-
sions in the contents of authoritative codes and standards
are not limited in scope to the point of operation injury
itself. Most injuries involving power presses are merely
entrees into the legal network where such occurrences are
eventually molded into product liability litigations in
the courts.
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As recognized authoritative sources, the codes and
standards are looked upon as providing a gauge or measure
by which to judge the performance of the system in light
of the point of operation injury that is in question. The
ability of these sources to provide a suitable standard
weighs appreciably in the proper determination of liability
for the injury incurred during the metal forming system's
use. Unfortunately, the codes and standards are hard-
pressed to provide either adequate or accurate information.
Since they do not recognize or address themselves to the
metal forming system,the codes and standards are concerned
only with the press. As a result, the application of the
codes and standards, in these instances, gives the lay jury
member the impression that the press and the metal forming
system are one and the same. In many cases, the inference
of equivalency leads to the erroneous conclusion that an
injury arising out of the system's function is an injury
incurred on the press alone.
Present codes and standards contain no limitation
provisions with respect to machine life. The consequences
of this omission are amplified by the lack of adequate
statutes of limitations in most state's laws. The absence
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of any statutes of limitations based on the date of manu-
facture of machinery involved in industrial accidents has
resulted in retrospective application of the codes and
standards rather than perspective usage as intended. This
is especially significant in systems involving early vintage
presses and other components. In effect, these authorita-
tive sources are implying that early vintage presses, as
well as other system components, should in design and func-
tion appear on a par with equipment of present vintage.
With respect to the press component in particular, the codes
and standards are inferring that age, number of service
hours, and degrees of alteration or modification, are not
relevant to the proper functional performance of the mach-
ine. In particular, operational malfunctions due solely to
consequences of press age and service hours are erroneously
being regarded as design defects, rather than practical
examples of the fact that nothing can last forever!
The combination of omissions of system related in-
structions and requirements in the codes and standards and
the lack of statutes of limitations, has resulted in a tre-
mendous increase in product liability litigation in the
courts. These actions, in turn, have forced judgments or
71.
settlements upon press manufacturers for injuries that, in
many cases, were the result of the metal forming systems
involved and not their component machines. Frequently,
the monetary values of these damages are substantial. As
a result, the press manufacturer's liability insurance costs
have substantially risen. A study involving eleven press
builders who had shipped a total of 338,199 mechanical power
presses prior to August 4, 1975, revealed that the total
insurance premium of these companies, in 1968,was $274,351. 15
In 1975, that premium total was $1,981,440. The following
increases were typical: $3,024. to $168,659., $5,747. to
$64,675., and $2,754. to $24,000. These increases are usual-
ly reflected in an accompanying rise in the manufacturer's
product's selling price. This economic action, ultimately
affects retail prices and the individual consumer.
The ability of present codes and standards to provide
the instructional and regulatory functions necessary to in-
sure adequate operator protection for the metal forming
system requires that these authoritative sources recognize
15Anderson Ashburn, ed., "The Crisis for Manufacturing
in Liability Litigation," American Machinist Special Report
688 (June, 1976):69.
72.
and make provisions for a system approach to point of oper-
ation safeguarding. The frequency of point of operation
accidents is indicative of the deficiencies in present ap-
plications of the safeguards available and in the content
of the codes and standards upon which their use is predicated.
The inclusion of system-oriented specifications is necessary
if these authoritative sources are to provide the system
designer/user with effective instruction and regulation
with respect to system protection. In this regard, recogni-
tion and acceptance of the component function of the press





A metal forming system approach is essential to pro-
viding adequate point of operation safeguards for the pro-
duction unit. Individual system component manufacturers
do not have the information required to adequately pro-
vide such operator protection. The possible variety in
content and arrangement of the press and other components
in the systems created requires their full definition in
order to adequately evaluate and provide the safeguards
required for their respective points of operation. This
is essential to the safeguard's ability to reflect in its
own design and function the characteristics of the parti-
cular metal forming system involved.
The present authoritative codes and standards fail to
recognize the true form and content of the metal forming
system and the component relationship of the press in that
production unit. No instructions or requirements reflect-
ing system considerations are set forth in the contents of
these authoritative sources. As a result, the approach to
the providing of system point of operation safeguards is
based on considerations related only to the press component
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and not the total system configuration for which the safe-
guards are intended. In addition, these codes and standards
are functional or performance-oriented and provide no in-
structions or requirements pertinent to design, construction,
installation or testing of these safety configurations or
any other system component. The application of these codes
and standards in their present form and content provides
ample illustration of their insufficient level of effective-
ness.
The three representative studies of metal forming
system point of operation injuries involving mechanical
power presses, as reviewed in Chapter IV, clearly indicate
that adequate point of operation safeguards are not being
provided. These studies show that insufficiencies in
operator protection are divided into three general cate-
gories:
A. Safeguards provided, but improperly in-
stalled, adjusted or circumvented by the
operator.
B. Safeguards, although properly installed,
provided insufficient protection.
C. Safeguards not provided.
The exclusion in most state's laws of any statutes of
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limitations based on the date of manufacture of machinery
involved in industrial accidents has further hampered the
effectiveness of present codes and standards. While in-
tended to be perspective, the failure of these authorita-
tive sources to include any reference or requirement relative
to practical limits of equipment life has resulted in their
being applied retrospectively. Malfunctions of the press
and other system components due solely to consequences of
machine age, have been termed defects in design and, thus,
have provided viable grounds for legal action. The legal
application of these codes and standards as a measure upon
which to evaluate the performance of the metal forming sy-
stem and its components, has, in part, influenced the sub-
stantial increase in product liability litigation. The
content of these authoritative sources has permitted inap-
propriate interpretations which have contributed toward
substantial economic consequences for machine manufacturers
as a result of the improper determination of liability with
respect to point of operation injuries.
Any meaningful approach toward permanent reductions
in point of operation injuries must be predicated on the
recognition of the metal forming system, in design and
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function, as the true production unit. Not until this is
accomplished can the required system criteria be developed
and included in present codes and standards. Such additions
are essential if these authoritative sources are to impart
the instruction necessary to insure the provision of proper




Present power press codes and standards must be re-
evaluated and revised to include the metal forming system
as the basic parameter upon which point of operation safe-
guards are provided for the protection of the operator.
The following provisions must be reflected in these re-
visions:
a. Recognition of the metal forming system is essen-
tial, with a complete definition of the system's
design and function, setting forth the individual
component categories involved.
b. Design and functional specifications must be pro-
vided for each component category. These provisions
must include specific requirements with respect to
the responsibilities of the individual component
designer/manufacturer for his particular component
as well as toward the system where his element will
be utilized.
c. Material specifications and design and construction
requirements must be provided which incorporate rea-
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sonable limits on "life" expectancies for the in-
dividual system components. Operational and safety
specifications relating to the component and to the
system must also be included.
d. Design and functional specifications must be pro-
vided for the designer/user of the system. These
provisions must include specific requirements with
respect to acceptable combinations of components
to insure a compatible and safe system operation.
More importantly, they must specify the designer/
user's responsibility for providing the system
point of operation safeguards required for proper
protection of the operator.
e. Guidelines and requirements relating to the modi-
fication or reconstruction of individual system
components are also necessary. Specifications
outlining the extent of and the manner in which
alterations are to be performed are also essential.
Equally important, the extent of the designer/
user's responsibilities with respect to such re-
visions as they affect the individual component
and the operation and safety of the system as a
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whole, must be clearly delineated.
f. Design and functional specifications must be pro-
vided for the designer/user to insure that proper
system considerations are reflected in point of
operation safeguards. Requirements must be set
forth to guarantee that a uniform standard of sy-
stem evaluation will be employed in the determin-
ation of essential safeguards. In addition, safe-
guard design, construction and installation speci-
fications, including material requirements, should
be provided. These are necessary in order to pro-
perly guide the designer/user in "in house" fabri-
cation of safeguards as well as in evaluating the
acceptability of safeguards that may be provided by
others.
g. Finally, specific adjustment and testing procedures
should be included to insure the proper functioning
of the provided point of operation protection prior
to its "on line" use.
Statutes of limitations should be added to state laws
pertaining to industrial machinery to provide limitations
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based on date of manufacture of machinery involved in in-
dustrial accidents. Presently, statutes of limitations
make provision only with respect to the time period per-
mitted for the injured party to seek recovery. The statutes
in this regard start to run at the time the injury occurred.
With respect to industrial accidents, limitations on injury
recovery have no dependence upon either the date of manu-
facture and shipment of the machine involved or the machine's
physical condition at the time of the accident. A machine
may provide proper function for many years and then be in-
volved in an accident which can result in the manufacturer
being named in a legal action for providing a defective
machine. This can occur whether the machine is still being
operated by the original owner or has been resold, or if it
has been maintained in its original design or been modified.
Either of the following forms of statutes of limitations
must be incorporated into present state laws in order to
provide an adequate and equitable solution to this critical
problem:
a. A statute of limitations should be adopted to
provide that if a machine furnishes trouble-free
service for a given number of years, then it is
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to be presumed to have been designed and manufac-
tured without defect. (North Carolina has adopted
such a statute and has set a period of five years
as an appropriate operating time requirement for
the machine.) A statute of this form would rectify
the "limitless" liability to which the manufacturer
is presently subjected as a result of a malfunction
of his machine due solely to old age. However, such
a statute would not prevent the manufacturer from
being sued on the grounds of a failure to properly
warn the operator of danger.
b. Provision should be made to specify that existing
statutes of limitations, in general, apply from the
date upon which an act occurred, rather than from
the date upon which an injury resulted from that
particular act. Thus, with respect to a defective
machine, the statute of limitations would run from
the date the machine was built (the act) and not
from the date of an injury resulting from the de-
fect in that machine. This form is less popular
since, in essence, it is setting a limitation on
the citing of any defect(s) contained in the ori-
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ginal machine. The previous statute form provides
a more positive function, since it limits legal
action against a machine which has proved itself
free from defect(s) by the test of time.
The inclusion of a system approach to safeguarding in
the codes and standards will provide the practical, instruc-
tional function necessary to reflect the specific character-
istics of the metal forming system in the safeguards that
will be utilized. Adoption of adequate statutes of limit-
ations will help provide valid guidance toward determining
actual liability and will properly direct recovery for
point of operation injuries which occur as a result of a
failure to conform to the system provisions of the codes
and standards.
The implementation of these recommendations in their
respective areas of application is necessary to any viable
effort toward a permanent reduction in injuries.
APPENDIX
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